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Abstract. In this paper we state the case for the performance eval-
uation of secure systems. We provide evidence of a wide variation in
performance of different secure methods. We further explore the over-
head introduced by secure functions in considering a case study in non-
repudiation. We present a model of a non-repudiation protocol specified
using the Markovian process algebra PEPA and present results derived
using mean value analysis and mean field approximation.
1 Introduction
The security of modern computer and communication systems is a major con-
cern for governments, organisations and individuals, resulting in a significant
effort to ensure, and prove, that systems remain secure and data remains pri-
vate. However, it is also essential that security measures do not impose excessive
constraints on the user which then encourage subversion of those measures in or-
der to make the system more usable. It should be clear that any security measure
that degrades usability is undesirable. However, all security measures will entail
some additional work being undertaken which imposes a performance overhead.
It is therefore essential that this overhead is understood, measured and min-
imised. In some practical situations there may be a choice of methods (including
varying protocols, algorithms or parameters) which could be employed. Changing
the choice of method could have a potentially significant impact on the system
performance without degrading the security. In other situations methods can be
modified (e.g. by changing a key length or refresh rate) which might improve
performance at the cost of some level of security, thus giving a security perfor-
mance trade-off [1]. However, quantifying this trade-off is not generally possible
due to a lack of quantitative methods for evaluating system security. Instead our
approach is based purely on evaluating the performance of the system and thus
giving the system designed information on competing designs.
Cryptographic protocols are one of the few areas of security have been re-
ceived attention from both security and performance communities [2–5]. For
example consider Figures 1-3, which illustrate the performance of different as-
pects of secure system behaviour. Figure 1 shows the average execution time for
a variety of cryptographic protocols for a specific message length. Figure 2 illus-
trates the dramatic variation in performance that can be achieved by varying the
key length for public key encryption algorithms. Figure 3 shows the measured
performance of different functions within a secure stock trading application, with
encryption and without. By considering data such as this, a system designer can
modify a secure system to take account of performance.
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Fig. 1. Average execution time for symmetric key encryption algorithms [4]
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Fig. 2. Execution time varied against key length for RSA and Diffie-Hellman [2]
2 Performance models of secure systems
A greater level of understanding of secure system performance can be gained
by specifying and analysing a performance model. A Key Distribution Centre
(key exchange protocol) has been studied in our previous work, which shows the
possibility of modelling by a stochastic process algebra PEPA and analysis by
several alternative techniques [7–9]. The advantage of using a formal specification
for such models is that it is possible to check specific properties to ensure that
the model correctly depicts behaviour which is essential to the security of the
  
Performance Comparison Between Encrypted and Unencrypted Data Transfer
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
Login Failure: Login Success: Buy Success: Buy Failure: Sell Success: Sell Failure:
Transaction Performed
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 T
im
e
 (
m
s
)
Encrypted Data
Unencrypted Data
Fig. 3. Average response time for functions within a secure trading application [6]
system. Thus a formal performance model and a formal security model of a
given system can be shown to exhibit equivalence, giving the system designed
some reassurance that the performance behaviour is valid. A process algebra
allows detailed behaviour to be modelled and has the potential to be modified
automatically through model transformations to facilitate alternative forms of
analysis.
3 A case study in non-repudiation
A non-repudiation service will prevent either of the principals involved from
denying the contract after the agreement. The two such protocols were proposed
by Zhou and Gollmann [10, 11] and use a non-repudiation server, known as a
Trusted Third Party (TTP). We will specify the first of these protocols, from
now on referred to as ZG1.
– A: originator of the non-repudiation exchange
– B: recipient of the non-repudiation exchange
– TTP : on-line trusted third party provide network services accessible to the
public
– M : message sent from A to B
– C: ciphertext for message M
– K: message key defined by A
– NRO = sSA(fNRO, B, L,C) : Non-repudiation of origin for M
– NRR = sSB(fNRR, A, L,C) : Non-repudiation of receipt of M
– sub K = sSA(fSUB , B, L,K) : proof of submission of K
– con K = sST (fCON , A,B, L,K) : confirmation of K issued by TTP
First, A sends the ciphertext (C) and a non-repudiation origin (NRO) for
message M to B, and then B replies back with a non-repudiation receipt (NRR)
to A. Now B possesses the ciphertext, but cannot read it as he still hasn’t got
the key to decrypt M . According to the non-repudiation requirement, B is not
a trusted agency to A for sending the key directly to B, they only can resort to
a trusted third party (TTP ). After receiving the key and proof of submission
(sub K), the TTP will generate a confirmation of K (con K) and publish in a
read only public area. Finally, B can get the key from this public area to decrypt
ciphertext (C) and A fetches the confirmation of submission as non-repudiation
evidence.
From this protocol specification we can derive the following PEPA model for
the complete system when there are N pairs of principals.
TTP
def
= (publish, rp).TTP
AB0
def
= (sendB, rb).AB1
AB1
def
= (sendA, ra).AB2
AB2
def
= (sendTTP, rt).AB3
AB3
def
= (publish, rp).AB4
AB4
def
= (getByA, rga).AB5
+(getByB, rgb).AB6
AB5
def
= (getByB, rgb).AB7
AB6
def
= (getByA, rga).AB7
AB7
def
= (work, rw).AB0
SystemZG1
def
= TTP [K] BC
publish
AB0[N ]
AB0 to AB7 in the above ZG1 PEPA model denote the different behaviours
of the AB component, and its evolution along the sequence of prescribed actions
in the protocol. The choice from AB4 to AB5 and AB6 means step 4 and step 5
in ZG1 can happen in any order. The work action is used to define that B can
do something with the key and ciphertext after he has obtained these, before
returning to the state AB0 to make a new request again, which forms a working
cycle to investigate the steady state.
Figure 4 shows the average queue length varied with number of customer in-
volved in this non-repudiation system solved by an ODE (approximate) solution
supported by the PEPA tools [?] and by exact mean value analysis [?].
The ODE approximation does not depend on deriving the state space of the
underlying Markov chain, hence it scales very well [?]. Furthermore, the solution
converges to the exact solution as the number of components increases, thus it
becomes extremely attractive for solving models of extremely large systems, as
illustrated in Figure 5.
Finally we show the relative performance between the ZG1 protocol and
another proposed by the same authors which is shown to be less scalable. Thus
a designer could use such a comparison to choose the appropraite protocol.
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Fig. 4. Average queue length varied with population size calculated by the ODE, rb =
rt1 = rga1 = rb = rt2 = rgb = rga2 = 1, rw = 0.01,K = 1
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Fig. 5. Average response time varied with population size calculated by the ODE,
rb = rt1 = rga1 = rb = rt2 = rgb = rga2 = 1, rw = 0.01,K = 1
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Fig. 6. Average number of waiting jobs with ZG1 and ZG3, rp = rt1 = rga1 = rb =
rt2 = rgb = rga2 = 1, rw = 0.01
4 Conclusions
In this paper we have explored the issue of modelling secure systems. Estimating
the costs (as well as the benefits) of security is important. We have shown that
not only can there be an appreciable overhead introduced by secure methods,
but also that the overhead can vary considerably according to the method em-
ployed. Thus there is a clear opportunity for the system analyst to improve, or
even optimise, performance by choosing or tuning the various algorithms and
protocols.
To date our analysis has focussed on identifying and employing efficient so-
lution methods. There is considerable scope for further work to investigate the
relationship between formal security models and formal performance models.
The ultimate goal would be to create a system which could automatically pro-
duce analysable performance models from security models. However, the choice
of security solution, driven by the performance security trade-off should always
remain an expert task.
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